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In 2010 the Academy Award for Best Animated Short Film went to LOGORAMA, a 16-minute film by French collective H5.  H5 used over 3,000 
trademarked logos and mascots without permission 
as backgrounds, plots and characters.  A Los Angeles 
is created from logos serving as buildings, street signs, 
vehicles and nature.  The inhabitants 
include AOL messengers, Pringles 
men, and Michelin men.  Ronald 
McDonald is the villain, who 
kills a foul-mouthed Haribo boy 
and takes the Big Boy burger boy 
hostage.  The Esso Girl is the heroine 
who escapes the X-Box earthquake 
causing California to sink into the 
ocean until the new state outlines are a Nike Swoosh.  
LOGORAMA is a spectacular movie, but many 
question whether it is legal under the Lanham Act and 
the 2006 Trademark Dilution Revision Act.  Since their 
trademarks were utilized without permission, all of the 
depicted trademark owners would seem to have claims 
for infringement and - given the crude and violent 
nature of the film - claims of dilution by tarnishment 
as well.  However, recent legislative interpretation 
and judicial proceedings appear to indicate that 
LOGORAMA is a commercial use eligible for the non-
commercial use exception under the Trademark Dilution 
Revision Act and protected free speech as parody under 
the First Amendment.1  
To constitute infringement, a mark must be used 
in commerce and likely to confuse consumers as to the 
product or service’s origin.2  Claims for infringement 
would be available to every mark in LOGORAMA that 
was in place of a tree, building, character, geography, 
vehicle, etc.  For example, in Caterpillar Inc., v. Walt 
Disney Co., Caterpillar sought to enjoin the release of 
Disney’s “George of the Jungle 2” movie because the 
exact Caterpillar trademark was depicted on Caterpillar 
bulldozers used throughout the movie.3  The Central 
1.  This paper is restricted to the United States treatment of Trade-
marks, state and federal cases are referenced for support. 
2.  Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 22 (2006).
3.  Caterpillar Inc., v. Walt Disney Co., 287 F. Supp. 2d. 913, 919-
District for Illinois court resisted applying a likelihood 
of confusion test to Caterpillar’s claim, but nonetheless 
briefly went through the factors.4  The court did 
not recognize the presence of competing trademarks 
because the trademarks depicted were the authentic 
trademark and not confusingly similar trademarks.5  
Likewise the court saw no competition 
between Caterpillar and “George of 
the Jungle 2” videos and DVD sales.6  
The court did note Disney’s bad intent 
in the unauthorized use of Caterpillar 
trademarks, but found it unconvincing as 
the Caterpillar trademark was not used to 
drive sales or derive consumer awareness 
of “George of the Jungle” videos and 
DVDs.7 
Additionally, the court did not see any evidence 
that in using the Caterpillar trademark Disney was 
attempting to “poach or free-ride on the fame and 
goodwill of Caterpillar’s trademarks.”8  In essence, 
Caterpillar’s claims rested heavily on the mere presence 
of its trademarks in the movie, and the court responded 
by pointing to a long history of products “bearing 
well known trademarks” incorporated into movies and 
television.9  The court held that the mere presence was 
not enough for claims of infringement or dilution in 
“George of the Jungle 2.”10  This judicial decision echoes 
others for the principle that permission is not needed 
for the use of brand names in fiction as long as the 
trademark refers specifically to the trademark owner and 
there is no confusion as to sponsorship or endorsement.
The same logic seems applicable to 
LOGORAMA.  Most of the marks used in the film 
are merely present in the film and representative of 
nothing more than themselves.  There is no presence 
921 (C.D. Ill. 2003).
4.  Id. 
5.  Id.
6.  Id.
7.  Id.
8.  Id.
9.  Id.
10.  Id.
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of competing marks - the marks used were specifically 
chosen because they were recognizable national brands 
that reference themselves and no other product.11  Like 
in Caterpillar, it cannot be said that the LOGORAMA 
film competes with or substitutes the market for the 
logos depicted in the film, whose products range from 
oil, fast food, toothpaste, financial services, etc.  It is 
unlikely that the public would think these trademark 
owners have branched into the film industry, much 
less as a collective.  The sheer abundance of trademarks 
utilized also weighs against consumer confusion.  It is 
hard to imagine that a reasonable person would watch 
LOGORAMA and believe that 3,000 trademark owners 
had functioned together to sponsor the film.  Audiences 
are accustomed to seeing trademarks in movies, and 
do not tend to assume from their presence that the 
trademarks depicted represent an endorsement or other 
indication of origin.  Rather, the marks are accepted as 
part of the visual vocabulary of the real world.  
Similar to Caterpillar, there is a possible 
argument for H5’s bad faith in using the 3,000 marks 
without permission.  In Caterpillar, the court focused 
on whether the mark was used to drive sales of the film, 
and found that it was not.12   LOGORAMA is unique 
in using nothing but logos, leading critics to question 
whether it would have garnered the same attention 
without the logos.  The use of the logos certainly called 
the film to the public’s initial attention; however, it was 
the expressive, and not commercial, use of these marks 
that was the heart of the film.  LOGORAMA was first 
available, and remains, free online - its commercial 
success can be attributed to winning the 2010 Academy 
Award rather than the mere use of the marks.13  Even if a 
trademark owner were to argue that the expression of the 
marks contributed to LOGORAMA sales, the Northern 
District of California court in Lucasfilm Ltd. v. Media 
Mkt. Group, Ltd. commented “expressive use of a mark 
is not rendered commercial by the impact of the use on 
sales.”14
11.  Nominative fair use is not discussed in this paper, as the main 
elements of the doctrine concern protection for using one brand to 
reference or distinguish another in a descriptive sense.  Here there 
are no competing brands so nominative fair use is inapplicable, 
other then a stretched argument that LOGORAMA does not use 
the brands more then is necessary than to describe the world it cre-
ates.  
12.  Caterpillar Inc., v. Walt Disney Co., 287 F. Supp. 2d. 913, 919-
921 (C.D. Ill. 2003).
13.  LOGORAMA can be viewed free of charge at UsefulArts.us, 
http://usefularts.us/2010/04/24/watch-logorama-trademarks/.
14.  Lucasfilm Ltd. v. Media Mkt. Group, Ltd., 182 F. Supp. 2d 
897, 900 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
If Caterpillar is controlling, then the additional 
claim of dilution by tarnishment against LOGORAMA 
is more compelling.  Dilution does not require a 
likelihood of confusion.15  Dilution by tarnishment 
does require that a mark harm the reputation of a 
famous mark.16  This happens when the mark is cast in 
an unflattering light, typically through its association 
with inferior or unseemly products or services.17  The 
trademark’s reputation and commercial value could 
be harmed “because the public will associate the lack 
of quality or the lack of prestige in the defendant’s 
goods with the plaintiff’s unrelated goods, or because 
the defendant’s use reduces the trademark’s reputation 
and standing in the eyes of consumers as a wholesome 
identifier of the owner’s products or services.”18  Finally, 
dilution by tarnishment is a claim only available 
to famous marks.19   Through the eight factors, the 
Trademark Dilution Revision Act effectively restricts 
“famous” to nationally recognized brands.20  In 
LOGORAMA, the characters that dominate the plot 
are Ronald McDonald, the Esso Girl, Big Boy, Haribo, 
Michelin, Pringles, and, to a lesser extent, Green Giant 
and Mr. Clean.  All these marks are representative of 
national brands and are therefore arguably “famous.”  
In LOGORAMA it is these famous marks that make 
up the lead characters, responsible for the cursing, sex, 
and extreme violence that drive the plot.  However, 
the remaining national brands used as buildings, 
geography, vehicles, and street signs may be eligible 
for consideration under the requirement of harm to 
reputation due to their inclusion in the film that features 
hyper language, sex, and violence.  H5 specifically 
chose 3,000 famous national brands for use because 
they wanted them to be widely recognized by the 
public.  However, on this claim LOGORAMA can be 
argued to be a protected free speech parody under the 
non-commercial exception of the Trademark Dilution 
Revision Act.
The key factor in finding a non-commercial 
use exception under dilution by tarnishment is that an 
offending mark must be tied to a product or service and 
15.  Federal Trademark Dilution Act, 15 U.S.C. 1125 (2006)
16.  Id.
17.  ToysRUs was successful in bringing a tarnishment claim 
against adultsrus.com, a pornographic web-site selling adult enter-
tainment toys and video.  Toys “R” Us v. Akkaoui, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1836 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
18.  Deere & Co. v. MTD Products, Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 43 (2nd Cir. 
1994).
19.  Federal Trademark Dilution Act, 15 U.S.C 1125(c) 
(2006).
20.  Id.
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used in commerce. 21  In Mattel, Inc., v. MCA Records 
Inc., the “Barbie Girl” case, the Ninth Circuit court 
commented on the “noncommercial use” exception 
to the Anti-Dilution Act.22  Mattel brought suit for 
infringement and dilution by tarnishment against MCA 
Records for the single “Barbie Girl” by Aqua wherein 
Barbie was enticed to “go party.”23  The court found the 
song to be a “commercial use in commerce,” because 
the song and the album used the mark and were sold 
to the public.24  However, it also found “Barbie Girl” 
to be eligible for the non-commercial use exception, 
stating a “use in commerce” does not preclude a “non-
commercial use” exception.25  Deciding whether speech 
is commercial or non-commercial brings the First 
Amendment into the fight.
Previously in Hoffman v. Capitol Cities/ABC Inc., 
the Ninth Circuit court delineated between commercial 
and noncommercial speech.26  In Hoffman, a magazine 
printed unauthorized altered images of Dustin Hoffman 
and others.  Hoffman sued for the unauthorized use of 
the Tootsie image.  The court held that “the ‘core notion 
of commercial speech’ is that it ‘does no more than 
propose a commercial transaction.’”27  The court found 
that if speech is not “purely commercial,” meaning it 
does more than a mere commercial transaction, than it is 
not infringing for trademark purposes but entitled to full 
protection under the First Amendment.28  Specifically, 
it held that regardless of the commercial nature, the 
magazine ad was protected because of “humor” and 
“visual and verbal editorial comment.”29  The fact that 
commercial elements were “inextricably entwined with 
[these] expressive elements,” lent it protection against 
trademark infringement and dilution.30  Mattel also 
applied this standard and found “Barbie Girl” by Aqua 
to likewise not be purely commercial speech because it 
21.  “Dilution” refers to the “whittling away of the value of a trade-
mark” when it’s used to identify different products.  J. Thomas Mc-
Carthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 24.67, at 
24-180; § 24.70  (2001).
22.  Mattel, Inc., v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 
2002). 
23.  Id at 900.
24.  Id at 904.
25.  Id at 906., citing Jerome Gilson et al., Trademark Protection 
and Practice § 5.12[1][c][vi], at 5-240.
26.  Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 
2001).
27.  Id. at 1184 (quoting Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 
U.S. 60 (1983)).
28.  Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1186 (9th 
Cir. 2001).
29.  Id.
30.  Id.
expressed Aqua’s view of Barbie.31  
LOGORAMA does not use any of the 3,000 
marks in connection to a product or service other 
then those of the trademarks themselves.  Rather, 
LOGORAMA utilizes the 3,000 marks to create a world 
of contemporary visual vocabulary.  The marks are 
innovatively used for commentary on themselves as well 
as in relationship to each other.  Similar to Hoffman, the 
commercial value of the LOGORAMA is inextricably 
entwined with expressive elements, and therefore the 
entirety should be protected under the First Amendment 
by its’ “visual and verbal editorial comment.”32  Thus, 
under Mattel and Hoffman, it would be difficult to 
cast LOGORAMA as “purely commercial” speech.  
LOGORAMA therefore should be eligible for the non-
commercial speech exception to the Trademark Dilution 
Revision Act and protected under the First Amendment. 
Specifically, LOGORAMA should be protected as a 
parody.
In Mattel, the “Barbie Girl” song was found 
to be a parody that ridicules the image and cultural 
values Barbie supposedly represents.33 Mattel points 
out further legislative history to support that parody 
- satire; editorial and other forms of expression were 
specifically not part of a commercial transaction in the 
purposing of the Trademark Dilution Revision Act.34  
Mattel referenced a previous ruling in LL Bean, Inc. v. 
Drake Publishers, Inc. affirming the parody protection.35   
LL Bean sought to enjoin the release of the magazine’s 
article “L.L. Beam’s Back-To-School-Sex-Catalogue,” 
which depicted a mark similar to L.L. Bean’s and 
showed nude models using products in sexually explicit 
positions.36  The First Circuit court held this to be a 
parody, noting that if the anti-dilution statute allowed 
trademark owners to enjoin an unauthorized use of its’ 
31.  Mattel, Inc., v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 
2002).
32.  Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1186 (9th 
Cir. 2001).
33.  Mattel, Inc., v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 
2002).
34.  The proposed law “will not prohibit or threaten noncommer-
cial expression, such as parody, satire, editorial and other forms of 
expression that are not a part of a commercial transaction.” Mattel, 
Inc., v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 906 (9th Cir. 2002) (quot-
ing 141 Cong. Rec. S19306-10, S19310 (daily ed. Dec. 29, 1995) 
(statement of Sen. Hatch); 141 Cong. Rec. H14317-01, H14318 
(daily ed. Dec. 12, 1995) (statement of Rep. Moorhead)).
35.  Mattel, Inc., v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 
2002).
36.  L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 
1987).
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trademark from being used in noncommercial contexts 
that were negative or offensive then “a corporation could 
shield itself from criticism by forbidding the use of its 
name in commentaries critical of its conduct.”37  The 
First Circuit cited noncommercial settings to include 
editorial or artistic context communicating ideas or 
expressing points of view.38  Furthermore, the court 
referenced a previous decision in which it held that 
neither the strictures of the First Amendment, nor the 
history and theory of anti-dilution law permit a finding 
of tarnishment based solely on the presence of an 
unwholesome or negative context in which a trademark 
is used without authorization.39  LOGORAMA depicts 
the majority of its unauthorized famous marks in an 
unwholesome context, such as Ronald McDonald killing 
the Haribo Boy and taking Big Boy hostage, an up-
the-skirt view of the Green Giant, and an extroverted 
homosexual Mr. Clean zoo guide.  L.L. Bean and Mattel 
would indicate that though perhaps unwholesome and 
negative, these depictions alone are not actionable.
The crux of such protected expression is a parody 
that requires the target of the parody to be the mark 
itself and not the use of the mark to make a broader 
statement.  In Rogers v. Koons, a copyright case, artist 
Jeff Koons made a sculpture from a photograph by Art 
Rogers.40  The Second Circuit found Koons’ parody fair 
use defense unconvincing.41  The court held that the 
copyrighted work is required to be at least in part the 
target of the defendant’s satire to be legally considered a 
“parody.”42  However, the court also said that the “satire 
need not be only of the copied work and may . . . also 
be a parody of modern society” but it was critical the 
original work still be a target as well.43  The purpose 
of this requirement was the court’s insistence that “the 
audience be aware that underlying the parody there 
is an original and separate expression, attributable to 
a different artist.”44  The court did not find parody or 
37.  Trademark rights do not entitle the owner to quash an unau-
thorized use of the mark by another who is communicating ideas or 
expressing points of view.  See L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, 
Inc., 811 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1987) (quoting Lucasfilm Ltd. v. High 
Frontier, 662 F. Supp. 931 (D.C. 1985)).
38.  L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 31-34 
(1st Cir. 1987).
39.  Id.
40.  Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 311 (2d Cir. 1992).
41.  Id.
42.  Id.
43.  Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 311 (2d Cir. 1992) (citing 
MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d at 185 (2d. Cir. 1981); 3 Nimmer, § 
13.05[C] n. 60.9).
44.  Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 311 (2d Cir. 1992).
sufficient satire, as the commentary of the banality of 
society Koons was after could have been achieved by 
other means and was not tied to the Rogers work for 
expression.45 
The copyright understanding of parody and 
satire is analogous in trademark law, as the court in 
Mattel relied on this in deciding that the “Barbie Girl” 
expression was protected as a parody.46  While targeting 
Barbie specifically, the song had a broader message as 
well due to Barbie’s status as a cultural icon in society.  
In contrast, the Ninth Circuit court in Dr. Seuss Ents., 
L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., did not find parody 
where the defendants used the writing style of Dr. Seuss 
and the trademark striped stovepipe hat on the front 
and back cover in a retelling of the O.J. Simpson trial.47  
Neither Dr. Seuss nor the trademarked Cat in the Hat 
were the targets of the parody, rather they were used 
to comment on the O.J. Simpson trial.48  The court 
held that in situations where the artistic work targets 
an original work and does not use it merely to garner 
attention, the First Amendment has greater weight in 
the balancing test of trademark interests and protected 
speech.49  
LOGORAMA targets the marks themselves 
in creating an elaborate parody for artistic expression.  
Ronald McDonald, a wholesome mark representing 
McDonald’s, is primarily used to engage children 
in the consumption of McDonald’s fast food.  In 
LOGORAMA, Ronald kills a child and threatens 
another before escaping on a Grease 2 motorcycle and 
crashing into a giant Weightwatchers truck.  Similar to 
Mattel where Aqua targeted the cultural values associated 
with the Barbie Icon, LOGORAMA here targeted the 
cultural values associated with McDonald’s icon, Ronald 
McDonald.  Both placed trademarked icons in hyper 
realities of sex or violence to parody their traditional 
values.  During the X-Box earthquake, the corporate 
symbols initially shown as pillars in the society are seen 
crashing to the earth- including the Enron, K-Mart, 
and Freddie Mac corporations that have been involved 
in recent and very public scandals.  Likewise, logos 
seen drowning in oil include Phillips 66, Chrysler, 
and the “W” from the George W. Bush reelection 
45.  Id.
46.  Mattel, Inc., v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 
2002).
47.  Dr. Seuss Ents., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394 
(9th Cir. 1997).
48.  Id.
49.  Id. at 1408.
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campaign of 2004 - all logos connected strongly to oil 
production.  While not all of the marks achieve the 
same level of parody, as already discussed in Caterpillar, 
mere presence is not actionable.  Additionally, those 
logos that don’t have as strong of a claim to parody 
are not used “merely to garner attention” which was 
the concern in Dr. Seuss.  The use of every mark lends 
to the greater message of the film.  One such instance 
occurs near the end of the film as an IBM building is 
seen collapsing.  As it falls to the ground its slogan loses 
an “s” to read “Solutions for a mall planet.”  The larger 
parody is of a hyper consumption of the developed 
world and the overwhelming presence of brands in the 
public consciousness.50  However, it is important to note 
that this broader parody is a natural result of parodying 
multiple brands at once and is not an independent 
critique that could have been made without the use of 
marks.  Thus, LOGORAMA would seem to fit nicely 
into the Koons’ court’s consideration of copyright, in that 
a parody can be a parody of modern society as long as 
the original work is still targeted.51  
This difference is important to note because the 
line between parody and satire is a hotly debated topic 
since Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.52  There, the 
Supreme Court differentiated between a parody that 
targets and mimics the original work to make its point 
and a satire that uses the work to criticize something 
else, therefore requiring justification for the very act of 
borrowing.53  The Court specifically avoided creating a 
bright line rule regarding parody and satire in Campbell, 
pointing out the often hybrid nature of parody 
and satire.54  Campbell merely states that the more 
attenuated the parody, the stronger the scrutiny and that 
“looser forms of parody may be found to be fair use, as 
may satire with lesser justification for the borrowing than 
would otherwise be required.”55  Recent developments 
support the specific protection of unauthorized use 
trademarks in satire based on their intrinsic expressive 
value in society.
50.  Esteban Del Rio, FlowTV, Logorama’s Chaotic Critique of Cor-
porate Rule, Mar. 26 2010 available at http://flowtv.org/?p=4857.  It 
is important to note this article uses parody and satire interchange-
ably, and does not use them in a legal sense.  
51.  “Though the satire need not be only of the copied work and 
may . . . also be a parody of modern society, the copied work must 
be, at least in part, an object of the parody.” Rogers v. Koons, 960 
F.2d 301, 310 (2d Cir. 1992).
52.  Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 US 569 (1994).
53.  Id. at 582.
54.  Id.
55.  Id.
Judge Kozinski, who wrote the majority opinion 
in Mattel, noted in his 1993 speech “Trademarks 
Unplugged” that “when trademark owners put their 
mark to the public in well-orchestrated campaigns 
intended to burn them into our collective consciousness, 
the owners must then relinquish control over the 
trademark as a consequence of seeking such exposure 
because the mark has taken on symbolic meaning as part 
of society at large.”56 After a trademark has become part 
of the public discourse, the paramount concern in any 
balancing test must be the public’s right to make use 
of the mark.57  Further judicial proceedings have noted 
trademarks’ unique expressive capacity as well.
In Yankee Publishing, Inc., v. News American 
Publishing, Inc., the Southern District of New York court 
noted that many trademarks assume expressive value due 
to their prominence in culture.58  “When unauthorized 
use of another’s mark is part of a communicative message 
and not a source identifier, the First Amendment is 
implicated in opposition to the trademark right.”59  In 
Rogers v. Grimaldi, the Second Circuit court held that 
“in general the [Lanham] Act should be construed to 
apply to artistic works only where the public interest 
in avoiding consumer confusion outweighs the public 
interest in free expression.”60  Famous marks have 
particularly strong powers of expression, especially if 
they are cultural icons.61  Their fame has integrated the 
marks into daily life as well as public vocabulary; the use 
of the trademark is the most efficient way to reference 
it.62  The emerging arguments concerning trademarks’ 
unique expressive power in the public consciousness 
would seem to strengthen the argument for satire.  In 
a world populated by brands, it becomes necessary to 
include marks, whether the subject of parody or satire, 
for the expression to be successfully understood.  The 
Mattel court seems to agree, stating, “Trademarks often 
fill in gaps in our vocabulary and add a contemporary 
flavor to our expressions.”63  Thus, if LOGORAMA were 
56.  Alex Kozinski, Judge, United States Trademarks Unplugged, 68 
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 960, 976 (1993).
57.  Id.
58.  Yankee Publ’g, Inc., v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc, 809 F.Supp. 267, 
282 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
59.  Id.
60.  Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1000 (2d Cir. 1989).
61.  Steven Cordero, Cocaine-Cola, The Velvet Elvis, and Anti-Bar-
bie: Defending the Trademark and Publicity Rights to Cultural Icons, 8 
Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L. J.  599 (1998).
62.  Robert Denicola, Trademarks As Speech, 1982 Wis.L.Rev. 158 
(1982).
63.  Mattel, Inc., v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 901 (9th Cir. 
2002).
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to be considered satire rather than parody, it is possible 
it would still be protected.  It is hard to talk about 
brands and consumption without using the brands that 
are nationally known.  As a result of the film utilizing 
so many marks, LOGORAMA naturally assumes a 
secondary meaning beyond the marks.  
Further support for a finding of non-commercial 
exception of parody in LOGORAMA is illustrated in 
Tommy Hilfiger Licensing, Inc. v. Nature Labs, LLC, 
where Tommy Hilfiger sought to enjoin an animal 
perfume entitled Timmy Holedigger.  The court for 
the Southern District of New York reasoned that the 
strength of the mark subject to parody might make it 
easier for an audience to recognize the use as a parody.64  
The marks used in LOGORAMA are nationally 
recognized brands whose reputation is well established, 
their depiction in the film is in total opposition to 
their established reputation.  This extreme contrast 
should assist in a finding of parody.  The concern in 
the copyright Koons case was that the audience must be 
aware that there is an original and separate expression 
attributable to a different artist.65  In the hands of 
H5, the marks in LOGORAMA become something 
other and extremely different than what they were and 
it is understood these new marks are their creation, 
independent of the originals.  Additionally, in deciding 
trademark dilution in Caterpillar, the court emphasized 
the “cartoon” nature of the film through its borrowing of 
motifs from animated films such as “belated recognition 
close-ups, collisions so bone-jarring that George’s 
outline is left embedded into a tree and other such well 
established cartoon clichés that clearly establish the 
fantastic nature of the movie.”66  This fantastic nature 
lends to the idea that the public would not see the 
Caterpillar trademark used in the movie as an association 
that would harm the reputation of the trademark 
owner.67  LOGORAMA is an animated film, involving 
similar motifs of the cartoon genre that, like Caterpillar, 
establish the fantastic nature of the film.  Despite the 
extreme nature of the actions of many characters, 
the cartoon world should be sufficient for a court to 
find that the public would not see the associations in 
LOGORAMA to harm the marks depicted.  
Judicial precedent seems to indicate that those 
64.  Tommy Hilfiger Licensing, Inc. v. Nature Labs, LLC., 221 F. 
Supp 2d 410, 417 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
65.  Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 311 (2d Cir. 1992).
66.  Caterpillar Inc., v. Walt Disney Co., 287 F. Supp. 2d. 913, 923 
(C.D. Ill. 2003).
67.  Id.
trademark owners who would bring claims of trademark 
infringement and dilution by tarnishment against 
LOGORAMA are unlikely to be successful.  Factors that 
would normally be considered in a straight trademark 
infringement likelihood of confusion analysis are 
lacking.  Most notably, there is an absence of competing 
goods, as the marks represent themselves in the film 
and the film cannot be considered in competition with 
them based on the reasoning in Caterpillar.68  Also based 
on the sheer abundance of trademarks used, there is no 
likelihood of consumer confusion as to endorsement, 
sponsorship, or other indication of ownership.  In 
terms of dilution, artistic expression has been found 
to be outside the scope of the anti-dilution statute’s 
protection of unauthorized use of trademarks in the 
marketing of “incompatible products or services.”69  
LOGORAMA is thus a daring example of the non-
commercial use exception to the Trademark Dilution 
Revision Act and protected speech as parody under 
the First Amendment.  It is unlikely, however, that the 
courts will have a chance to decide on this issue.  Since 
winning the 2010 Academy Awards, LOGORAMA has 
garnered international attention and goodwill.  It would 
be poor policy on behalf of the trademark owners to file 
suit.  In fact, in the aftermath of the Oscars, it appears 
some trademark owners seem happy to have been 
recognized as “famous” enough to be included and have 
expressed no interest in pursuing trademark violation 
claims.70  As a tongue-in-cheek response to the whole 
trademark question, H5 producer Nicolas Schmerkin 
in his acceptance speech thanked the 3,000 non-official 
sponsors that appear in the film and assured them that 
no logos were harmed in the making of LOGORAMA.71
68.  Caterpillar Inc., v. Walt Disney Co., 287 F. Supp. 2d. 913 
(C.D. Ill. 2003).
69.  L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 34 (1st 
Cir. 1987).
70.  Cash Converter, a depicted trademark, thanked H5 for in-
cluding it in the film.  Esteban Del Rio, Logorama’s Chaotic Critique 
of Corporate Rule, FlowTV, Mar. 26 2010 available at http://flowtv.
org/?p=4857.
71.  Id. 
